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IN-HOUSE LIVE-CLIENT CLINICAL 
PROGRAMS: SOME ETIDCAL ISSUES 
James E. Moliterno* 
!NTRODUCriON 
I N recent years, clinicians and classroom professional responsibility professors have found themselves in one another's company 
through several different conferences and related devices.1 This cross-
over of interest in what one another does and the connections be-
tween and common interests of the two enterprises is healthy and 
overdue. As long as clinicians are the practice-teachers and profes-
sional responsibility professors teach about and study the law and cul-
ture of the practice, the crossover should be nurtured and developed. 
Some of those crossover occasions have given rise to concerns by 
classroom professional responsibility teachers that clinicians pay too 
little attention to the law of professional responsibility and to renewed 
concern by clinicians that classroom professional responsibility teach-
ers are out of touch with the day-to-day rigors of practice, especially 
poverty practice. 
Divisions between clinical faculty and classroom professional re-
sponsibility teachers are, in fundamental ways, not as sharp as they 
may appear. Some clinicians teach professional responsibility law in 
classroom settings; all clinicians teach professional responsibility in 
some form of that phrase's meaning; and all professional responsibil-
ity professors teach about the practice of law, the grist of the clini-
cian's mill. 
This paper is a small part of the continued crossover of interest. It 
is about ethical issues that attach themselves or arise \vith special fre-
quency in law school and in-house clinical programs. It raises ques-
tions that need further discussion as much as it attempts to answer 
those questions. 
I have broken the paper into two sections. The first identifies and 
examines broad, overarching questions about the ethics of clinical 
legal education: What is the moral/ethical value in clinical education? 
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, College of William & Mary School of Law. 
The author is grateful to Ann Luerssen for her research assistance on this project. 
1. Occasions that come to mind, among many, are the 1995 AALS Joint Program 
of the Clinical and Professional Responsibility Sections; the Keck Foundation sup-
ported conference at Duke in October 1995 (papers and proceedings published in 
Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 1995, 
at 1); and the March 1996 and March 1997 Keck Foundation supported conferences 
on teaching legal ethics at \Villiam & Mary (papers and proceedings published in 
Symposium, W.M. Keck Foundation Fomm on the Tead1ing of Legal Ethics, 38 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1 (1996); and Symposium,J997 W.M. Keck Foundation Fomm on Teach-
ing of Legal Ethics, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 283 (1998)). 
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Is there an inherent conflict between the educational and the service 
missions of clinics? Can clinicians teach legal practice and, simultane-
ously, be the practice about which they teach (this is Professor 
Condlin's question)?2 
The second section identifies and examines applications of the pro-
fessional responsibility rules to law school clinics, selecting out a hand-
ful of situations that are either unique to law school clinical practice or 
that arise with special frequency or character in law school clinical 
practice such as: conflicts of interest among law students with other 
job commitments (either concurrent or summer), interclinic conflicts, 
and confidentiality applications. 
I. THE BROAD IssuEs 
Clinical legal education has a combination of goals, among them, 
providing professional skills instruction? teaching methods of learning 
from experience,4 instructing students in professional responsibility,5 
serving clients (poor people in particular),6 and critiquing the capaci-
ties and limitations of lawyers and the legal system.7 This combina-
tion, especially the goals of providing client service (good lawyering) 
and critiquing the practice and profession of law, presents the rub that 
has long bedeviled thoughtful clinicians. Some might say this rub is 
too much for clinical legal education to bear; others might find the 
difficulties the rub presents are overwhelmed by the beneficial effects 
of active learning that are found in experiential education vehicles like 
clinics and by the services clinics provide. 
The benefits of active learning devices such as clinics for the pur-
poses of enhancing students' ethical and moral compass and their 
learning of professional responsibility law are significant for several 
reasons. In Aristotelian terms, clinical experiences allow students to 
develop virtue by the doing of virtuous acts. Clinical teaching lends 
itself to student enculturation into the profession. Clinical experience 
helps to develop the student's understanding of professional responsi-
bility law because so much of that law concerns the relationships to 
which lawyers are parties. 
2. See Robert J. Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the 
Decade, 33 J. Legal Educ. 604, 607 (1983); Robert J. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: 
Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 Md. L. Rev. 
223, 281-82 (1981) [hereinafter Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes]; Robert J. Condlin, 
'Tastes Great, Less Filling': The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. Legal 
Educ. 45, 45 (1986) [hereinafter Condlin, Tastes Great, Less Filling];. 
3. See Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. Legal 
Educ. 508, 512-13 (1992) [hereinafter Report]. 
4. See id. at 513. 
5. See id. at 513-14. 
6. See id. at 515. 
7. See id. at 516. 
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A. Clinical Teaching Has a Positive Moral-Ethical Value 
Whether done in clinics or classrooms, professional ethics teaching 
serves an arguably higher and unquestionably more elusive goal than 
is served by legal education generally. This goal has been character-
ized as the teaching of "character," "integrity," "virtue," and "val-
ues."8 This goal, however characterized, is not uniformly regarded as 
being achievable.9 Indeed, whether the law school e}.-perience gener-
ally, and course work in ethics specifically, can positively affect stu-
dents' moral development at all has been the subject of considerable 
debate.10 The empirical evidence that exists indicates that neither the 
standard first-year law experience nor the single semester, free-stand-
ing legal profession course has a measurable effect on students' val-
ues.U Those who argue that ethics and virtue can be taught to law 
students argue from an Aristotelian view-influenced by Kohlberg's 
8. See James R. Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics, 10 J. Legal Prof. 37,37-39 (1995) 
(discussing "virtue"); Donald C. Mulcahey, A Plea for Moral Education in Law 
Schools, 2 J.L. & Religion 101, 102 (1984) (discussing "values"); Terrance Sandalow, 
The Moral Responsibility of Law Sdzools, 34 J. Legal Educ. 163, 169 (1984) (discuss-
ing "character"); John V. Tunney, Is the Bar Meeting Irs Ethical Responsibilities?, 12 
San Diego L. Rev. 245, 247 (1975) (discussing "integrity"). There arc obvious differ-
ences among the various characterizations, but all name a goal of teaching of a higher 
order than the mere conveyance of knowledge about a set of rules, whose violation 
may produce a penalty. They name a human character trait of higher order than 
obedience to authority. 
9. The goal is also not uniformally regarded as desirable. For references to those 
who say that legal education should remain "value neutral," see infra note 10. In an 
interesting display of both candor and contemporaneous feelings of helplessness and 
hopefulness, Justice Tom C. Clark has said that even though many academics say that 
they cannot teach virtue, they must, because no one else can either. See Tom C. Clark, 
Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 San Diego L. Rev. 249, 253 {1975). 
10. I leave aside the related question of whether the law school sho11ld attempt to 
teach values, see, e.g., Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Moral VISion and Profes-
sional Decisions: The Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers 44 (1989) 
("Only through training do most lawyers develop an 'indifference to a \vide variety of 
ends and consequences that in other contexts would be of undeniable moral signifi-
cance."' (quoting Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Is-
sues, Hum. Rts., Fall1975, at 1, 5)); Donald T. Weckstein, Boulder II: lVIzy and How, 
41 U. Colo. L. Rev. 304, 306 (1969) (stating that "law schools can make a small contri-
bution to [teaching values], but [their] main concern should be directed to other ar-
eas"), and the argument that the overall law school e:>:perience is a negative teacher of 
ethics, see, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, How the Law Sdzool Fails: A Polemic, 1 Yale Rev. 
L. & Soc. Action 71,71 (1970) (criticizing the current "malaise" in law schools); Paul 
N. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Ed11cation, 19 Yale LJ. 444, 487 (1970) 
(arguing that "talk about democratic values and social policy is just so much crap"). 
11. See Jethro K. Leiberman, Crisis at the Bar: Lawyers' Unethical Ethics and 
What to Do About It 226 (1978); Robert M. Ackerman, Law Sdzools and Profes-
sional Responsibility: A Task for All SeasollS, 88 Dick. L. Rev. 202, 205-06 (1983); 
Jerome E. Carlin, What Law Sdzoo/s Can Do Abolll Professional Responsibility, 4 
Conn. L. Rev. 459, 459 (1971-72); Harry W. Jones, Lawyers and Justice: Tile Uneasy 
Ethics of Partnership, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1978). Sandelow writes: 
Law schools are not, to be sure, well positioned to play a decisive role in 
fomling their students' characters. Students come to law school as adults. 
The deplorable faculty-student ratio at all law schools largely precludes a 
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work12-that virtue can be learned by adults primarily through doing 
virtuous, role-sensitive acts. They argue that a student begins to de-
velop a role-sensitive morality on the first day of the law school expe-
rience, and not beforeP Certainly, to the extent that the would-be 
lawyer begins to develop "attitudes and insights" into the role of law-
yer on the first day of law school, 14 the law school experience will 
affect, for good or ill, the student's level of virtue.15 
Nearly everyone who argues that virtue can be taught bases the ar-
gument on the Aristotelian view that virtue is learned by the doing of 
virtuous role-sensitive acts. Someone making the Aristotelian based 
argument expects both the standard first year of law school and the 
level of personal contact which might permit faculty members to become an 
important personal influence in the lives of their students. 
Sandelow, supra note 8, at 169; see also DanielS. Kleinberger, Wanted: An Ethos of 
Personal Responsibility-Why Codes of Ethics and Schools of Law Don't Make for 
Ethical Lawyers, 21 Conn. L. Rev. 365, 378 (1989) (stating that "the thrust of legal 
education runs counter to moral instruction" and that "legal education actually alien-
ates students from whatever values they had when they entered (law] school"); Wag-
ner P. Thielens, Jr., The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional 
Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. Legal Educ. 587, 591 (1969) (detailing a study that mea-
sured the change in law students' ethical views as they progressed through law 
school); Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law 
Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. Legal Educ. 306, 307 (1981) 
(providing an overview of developmental psychology to explore the ethical limits of 
teaching students to "think like lawyers"). Shaffer and Redmount seem to say that 
legal education neither nurtures nor impedes students' moral development. See 
Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert S. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students and People 
(1977). 
12. See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral 
Stages and the Idea of Justice (1981). Kohlberg argues that people develop sequen-
tially through a series of stages of moral reasoning, the development continues into 
adulthood, and only a small percentage of people ever reach the final stage. See id. at 
101-89. 
13. Implicit in every article arguing for a better way of teaching ethics in the legal 
profession is the position that it can be taught. For a sampling of such articles, sec 
Michael J. Kelly, Legal Ethics and Legal Education 5-21 (1980); Elkins, supra note 8, 
at 81-83; David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Pro-
gramfor Legal Ethics, 40 Md. L. Rev. 451,451-56 (1981); David Luban, Epistemology 
and Moral Education, 33 J. Legal Educ. 636,636-37 (1983) (hereinafter Luban, Episte-
mology]; Mulcahey, supra note 8, at 103; Sandelow, supra note 8, at 166-69; Thomas 
L. Shaffer, Moral Implications and Effects of Legal Education or: Brother Justinian 
Goes to Law School, 34 J. Legal Educ. 190, 191-98 (1984); AndrewS. Watson, Law-
yers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 248, 249-52 (1975) (hereinafter Watson, Lawyers and Professional-
ism]; AndrewS. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological As-
pects of Legal Education, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 91, 104-06 (1968) (hereinafter Watson, 
The Quest]; Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional 
Responsibility, 16 J. Legal Educ. 1, 7-10 (1963). For a full explication of this position, 
see Willging & Dunn, supra note 11. 
14. See James P. White, Professionalism and the Law School, 19 Cumb. L. Rev. 
309, 314 (1989). 
15. Indeed, Watson suggests that the role-sensitive formation is suspended until 
entry to law school. See Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 249-
52; Watson, The Quest, supra note 13, at 124-37. 
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standard free-standing ethics-legal profession course, neither of which 
allow the students to do much of anything save read and think about 
legal issues and doctrine,16 to be utter failures if their goal were to 
teach virtue. Even the apparent failure of the short-term clinical work 
to affect moral development17 positively is explainable to the advocate 
of the Aristotelian view because students usually lack the opportunity 
to see the long-term results of their conduct on relationships, the qual-
ity of which form the basis for a system of ethics.18 If virtue can be 
taught to law students, it is most likely to occur in long-term, experi-
ential learning vehicles such as year-long clinics.19 
B. Why Clinics are Good at Teaching the Role of Lawyer: 
Playing a Game 
Consider the respect in which the rules of ethics themselves (or 
more generally, the law of lawyering) are analogous to the rules gov-
erning a game: the game cannot be played \vithout reference to the 
rules, but the performance by the players-while referenced to those 
rules-really "responds to a sense of quality that seems far removed 
from any set of rules."20 In this respect, learning to play the game well 
(learning to lawyer ethically) is accomplished not so much by learning 
the game's rules, though learn them the players must, as by the activ-
ity of playing (the experiences \vith lawyering behavior). Learning the 
rules of the game can be separated from learning to play well in terms 
of teaching methodology: a player might well learn the text and basic 
meaning of the rules by reading and discussing them; but to learn the 
subtleties that define what it means to play well, the player must expe-
rience the play itself. 
Teaching professional responsibility law by supervised experience in 
role-sensitive activities is especially advantageous for another reason. 
Unlike other law subjects, the law of professional responsibility is 
about lawyers' relationships. Lawyer experience is a significant part 
16. Neither of these activities bear a close role-sensitive relationship to the ethics 
of lawyering except that the lawyer, to be ethical, must provide competent service, 
often requiring both reading and thinking about legal issues and principles. 
17. See Eugene L. Smith, Some Sodological and Psydzologica/ Problems in Edu-
cation for Professional Responsibility, in Education in the Professional Responsibili-
ties of the Lawyer 295 (Donald T. Weckstein ed., 1970). 
18. About 62% of in-house, live-client clinics are partial-year clinics (one quarter 
or one semester). See Report, supra note 3, at 512. 
19. Alternatively, one might argue that teaching the law governing lawyers and 
the consequences of its breach will produce virtuous, or at least law compliant, acts. 
See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897). This ap-
proach to producing enhanced moral behavior comports with behaviorist theories. See 
Albert Bandura & Richard H. Walters, Social Learning and Personality Development 
168-200 (1963); see also B.F. Skinner, About Behaviorism 193 (1974) ("[W]hat we feel 
when we behave morally or ethically depends on the contingencies responsible for 
our behavior."). 
20. Elkins, supra note 8, at 41 (footnote omitted). 
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of the law governing lawyers. For example, when a student is negoti-
ating in the role of lawyer, the student generates the data that gives 
meaning to the rules that prohibit making false statements of fact to 
others.Z1 By doing so, the student may see and sense the conflicts be-
tween the literal meaning of the prohibition and the nature of negotia-
tion as a process that implicates at least subtle techniques designed to 
mislead.22 What makes the activity invaluable to learning is the 
unique role that lawyer conduct plays in the development of the rele-
vant legal standards. The effect and operation of the substantive tort 
or contract law, for example, is experienced generally by members of 
the society governed by the legal rules under study; the lawyer gener-
ally experiences the effect and operation of law in a vicarious way 
through the direct encounters of the lawyer's clients with the law.23 
The lawyer experiences the law as an expert. Much of the substance 
of'the law governing lawyers, on the contrary, is tied inextricably to 
the relationships between lawyer and client, lawyer and lawyer, lawyer 
and law makers or deciders, and lawyer and society.Z4 In other words, 
much of the law governing lawyers is formed by a relationship that the 
lawyer experiences, unlike other fields in which the lawyer typically 
experiences the law only vicariously. As such, if they are so directed, 
clinics will be especially effective at teaching the law of professional 
responsibility. 
Role-sensitive activities not only provide significant learning about 
the data that give meaning to many standards governing lawyer be-
havior, but they also hold out the greatest hope for replicating the best 
aspects of the apprenticeship system: those that produced the sociali-
zation of the moral lawyer through the influence of a supervisor-men-
tor who was better than the organized bar's rules assumed.25 
21. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 (1998) (dealing with 
truth telling). 
22. See James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in 
Negotiation, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 926, 931. 
23. But see Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts Is Different, 67 
Fordham L. Rev. 443 (1998) (discussing the direct encounters that lawyers themselves 
have with contract law); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of 
Negligence Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 649 (1998) (discussing the direct encounters that 
lawyers themselves have with tort law). 
24. This distinction in lawyer level of interaction with the law governing lawyers 
and the rest of the substantive law partly explains the anomaly noticed by William 
Simon between the general legal realist approach to law and the more formalist ap· 
proach lawyers take to the "bounds of tlte law." See William H. Simon, Should Law-
yers Obey the Law?, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 217 (1996), reprinted in William H. 
Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 77-108 (1998). Lawyers 
may be less comfortable with some indeterminacy when they are the "client" upon 
whose conduct the law operates than they are when they are merely the expert for 
some other person who is the client. See id. 
25. See Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 195, 
217-18 (1986). 
1999] ETHICS & LIVE-CLIENT CLINICS 2383 
The conditions and timing of professional socialization have shifted 
in the last hundred years in American legal education. Office ap-
prenticeship-the law school of an earlier era-introduced the neo-
phyte to the principles of law and the principals-at-law 
simultaneously. In "reading" law, the apprentice combined theory 
and implementation in a gradually expanding responsibility. He be-
came a lawyer as he saw and assisted in real cases, in concrete situa-
tions, and with specific personalities. Ex-posed to live models of 
practicing attorneys and clients, he possessed realistic bases for 
learning the lawyer role. He coupled this increasing awareness with 
the gradual assumption of the rights and obligations of a member of 
the bar. Technical knowledge, prevailing practices, and professional 
values were articulated one step at a time.26 
Student role socialization is largely undeveloped at the time of entry 
to law schoot27 Taking advantage of this opportunity requires stu-
dents to engage in role sensitive activities in a psychologically mean-
ingful context,28 preferably early in their law school careers.29 
Over time, lawyers and the legal profession have lost something of 
value that the apprentice system once provided: the sense of the law-
yer as a moral force in society. This sense can be replicated in a long-
term, in-house clinic. Hopes for regaining this moral sense rest pri-
marily with the law school.3° For law schools to fulfill these hopes, 
they must take advantage of the opportunity to socialize students into 
the profession by presenting the student, acting in the role of lawyer, 
with the moral questions that face lawyers. Law schools can best facil-
itate this socialization by allowing students to face and reflect on these 
questions in the academic environment "without the heavy weight 
that self-interest [and modem law firm socialization] exerts on the 
practitioner ... :m Development of role and identity is the niche in 
which professional school training fits in the overall process of sociali-
zation of new members into the ethics of the profession. Legal educa-
tion can be influential in that development,32 because the resolution of 
role is delayed until at least the beginning of professional (especially 
26. Dan C. Lortie, Laymen to Lawmen: Law Sd1oo/s, Careers, and Professional 
Socialization, 29 Harv. Educ. Rev. 352, 363-64 (1959) {footnote omitted). 
27. See Lortie, supra note 26, at 363; Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra 
note 13, at 249-50. 
28. "[S]elf-concept crystallizes only where role performance is undertaken in a 
psychologically meaningful context." Lortie, supra note 26, at 366. 
29. See Clark, supra note 9, at 252-60; J. Michael Kelly, Notes on the Teaching of 
Ethics in Law School, 5 J. Legal Prof. 21, 27 (1980) (recommending a small-section 
"attorney-client relationship" class in the first year); White, supra note 14, at 316-317. 
30. See Clark, supra note 9, at 253. 
31. Andrew L. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility at xxix (3rd ed. 
1989). 
32. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Indoctrination Versus Relatil•ity in Value Education, 6 
Zygon 285, 305-08 (1972}; David AJ. Richards, Moral Theory, the Del•e/opmental 
Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. Legal Educ. 359, 361 
(1981). 
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legal) education.33 In order to develop virtue, one must do virtuous 
things,34 preferably under the guidance of a moral teacher.35 One can-
not morally develop by study alone.36 
C. The Potential Good of Modeling Lawyer Behavior and the 
Positive Moral-Ethical Contribution of Clinics 
The question of who in the law school is responsible for teaching 
ethics has occupied a considerable amount of legal educators' time 
over the years.37 Although some of this attention has been focused on 
the "pervasive method" of teaching ethics,38 most of the positive con-
tributions have focused on the faculty and administration of the law 
school as role models.39 
The notion of role modeling takes on several forms, from both posi-
tive and negative perspectives, live role models and storytelling. Gen-
erally, because student integration into the role of lawyer does not 
begin until the start of law school,40 and because the development of 
an identity or sense of self "largely results from emulation of those 
who are respected,"41 an opportunity exists to affect the development 
of students by the positive or negative42 examples that faculty set. 
33. See Lortie, supra note 26, at 363; Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra 
note 13, at 249-52. 
34. See G.M. Dickinson, Moral Development Theory and Clinical Legal Ecluca-
tion: The Development of Professional Identity, 22 U.W. Ont. L. Rev. 183, 186-96 
(1984). 
35. See Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi (Samuel L. Clemens ed., Harper & 
Brothers Publishers 1903) {1883); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. 
Legal Educ. 222, 224-27 {1984); Luban, Epistemology, supra note 13, at 650-651. 
36. See Luban, Epistemology, supra note 13, at 653. 
37. See David H. Vernon, Ethics in Academe-Afton Dekanal, 34 J. Legal Educ. 
205, 211 {1984); see also James E. Moliterno, Goodness and Humanness: Distinguish-
ing Traits?, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 203,208 {1989) (arguing that the claim of moral superior-
ity often raised by clinicians may reduce the pressure on other faculty to be positive 
role models). 
38. See David T. Link, The Pervasive Method of Teaching Ethics, 39 J. Legal Educ. 
485,486-87 (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional Respon-
sibility and Educational Reform, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 
139, 142; E. Wayne Thode & T.A. Smedley, An Evaluation of the Pervasive Approach 
to Education for Professional Responsibility of Lawyers, 41 U. Colo. L. Rev. 365, 366-
68 {1969). 
39. See Summary of Action Taken by the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association 21-22 (1989); Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of 
the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 275, 276 {1986); 
Richard Wasserstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer, 34 J. Legal Educ. 155, 
160 {1984); White, supra note 14, at 313-17. 
40. See Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 250. 
41. /d. 
42. L.H. LaRue, Teaching Legal Ethics by Negative Example: John Dean's Blind 
Ambition, 10 Legal Stud. F. 315, 316 {1986). 
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This notion is not new ,43 and in some respects it is no more than an 
acknowledgment that legal educators endeavor to replace the best as-
pects of the apprentice system of law teaching, which university legal 
education displaced in the late nineteenth century.-14 Certainly, this is 
the aspect that is implicated by the socialization of lawyers into the 
profession. 
Although many faculty members may hesitate to serve as role mod-
els because of a legitimate fear of exploiting a captive audience45-
because "[t]he universal human need to have objects for modeling and 
identity formation may be the single most important psychological 
factor in the educational process[ ]"46-the effect of both the presence 
and absence of positive models is too great to ignore. Example-teach-
ing, through active role modeling and storytelling, aims at instilling 
the more elusive qualities of the ideal lawyer. Only the generic form 
of the desired character traits, however, is likely to be transferred 
from faculty to students because the law teacher is not typically mod-
eling lawyering behaviors.47 Nonetheless, considerable learning oc-
curs when students observe model behavior that expresses integrity, 
commitment to quality, concern for the human condition, and a sense 
of community.48 
While there is value in the modeling of all of these traits, the sense 
of community is the one trait that is perhaps most uniquely within the 
power of law faculty as an entity to accomplish. The others might 
more profitably come from exposure to models of lawyering behavior. 
Lawyering models produce more readily transferable learning for the 
students from the law school to law practice, and are not as easily 
criticized as being virtuous in the ivory tower. On the other hand, the 
faculty either has or does not have a sense of community, and the 
faculty either does or does not convey it by its collective presence, its 
attitude about the common enterprise, and its actions toward one an-
other and toward students. 
43. "[T]eaching ethics is good; living ethics before one's class is incomparably bet-
ter." John C. Townes, Organization and Operation of a Law Sd!ool, 2 Am. L Sch. 
Rev. 436, 439 {1910). 
44. For a history of the process of apprentice system replacement with university 
legal education, see William R. Johnson, Schooled Lawyers: A Study in the Clash of 
Professional Cultures 42-57 {1978), and a letter from Harvard Dean Ephraim Gurney 
to University President Charles Eliot lamenting the earliest moments of the Langdel-
lian revolution in Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and 
Men, 1817-1967, at 187-90 (1967). 
45. Indeed, one reason said to oppose the pervasive method is that a single legal-
ethics professor might subvert the students. See Thode & Smedley, supra note 38, at 
371. 
46. Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 250. 
47. To the extent they are modeling such behaviors, they usually do so only in the 
context of the lawyer's rigorous legal analysis. 
48. Professor Shaffer is perhaps the foremost advocate for a better developed 
sense of community among lawyers and law schools. See Thomas L Shaffer, The 
Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 Ohio St. LJ. 703, 712 (1988). 
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The closer the model is to the role that must be learned, the more 
effective it will be.49 As such, the most effective modeling of lawyer 
behaviors will be done by those modeling the role of lawyer. Students 
may be exposed to those acting the role of lawyer in two ways: indi-
rectly, through storytelling and case studies of lawyers; and directly, 
by working with a lawyer in either actual or simulated client service. 
Clinical education provides the student the opportunity to work di-
rectly with a lawyer-one whose express goal is the modeling of virtu-
ous lawyer behavior. Such role modeling is direct with respect to 
student involvement and emotional proximity, and it is more closely 
connected to the behaviors to be modeled. 5° Clinical faculty are likely 
to have great influence on the moral development of their students 
through their actions and their policy choices. 
D. Moral and Ethical Questions Remain 
Despite these positive contributions of clinics to students' moral 
and ethical development, nagging questions remain to be explored 
further. 
Robert Condlin sent clinicians scrambling in the early eighties with 
a series of critical articles.51 Professor Condlin raised a category of 
moral failing in the in-house clinic: clinic teachers are reinforcing un-
desirable characteristics with controlling, dominating behavior. 
Condlin has persuasively argued that a combination of in-house clinic 
attributes make it a less than ideal place for students to learn the eth-
ics of the legal profession. Among these attributes is the tension of 
the co-counsel relationship between faculty and student that drives 
the faculty supervisor toward dominating behavior and diminishes the 
opportunity for critique of practice. Essentially, Condlin argued that 
while engaged in the practice being critiqued, clinicians are poorly 
positioned to critique,52 causing them to rationalize their own practice 
activities and, in the process, model "persuasion mode" domination of 
students.53 The clinic teaches students to dominate clients because 
students essentially pattern their interactions with clients after the cli-
nician's interactions with the student. Some critics of Condlin argued 
that his objections were against the adversarial system within which 
clinicians (and all lawyers) operate.54 Others confessed guilt to self-
reduced "charges" and argued that Condlin's complaint is about poor 
49. The implication of this phenomenon is that "ideas about professional behavior 
gathered from practicing lawyers will be eagerly grasped and emulated by the stu-
dent." Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 13, at 251 (emphasis added). 
50. See Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1, 54 (1978). 
51. See supra note 2 (listing articles by Condlin). 
52. See Condlin, Tastes Great, Less Filling, supra note 2, at 51, 55. 
53. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note 2, 233-35. 
54. See Norman Redlich, The Moral Value of Clinical Legal Education: A Reply, 
33 J. Legal Educ. 613, 614 (1983). 
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execution of in-house clinical education. 55 If Condlin is correct in as-
serting that the clinician's ego and the pressures of co-practice with 
inexperienced students lead to manipulating and dominating behav-
ior, then he is also correct to say a dominating clinician is more dan-
gerous than a dominating classroom teacher because the clinician is 
easily recognized by the student as the model of practice.56 Like it or 
not, while some clinicians claim their teaching is the place for students 
to learn the gentler arts,57 Professor Luban may be correct in observ-
ing that clinicians are drawn predominantly from former careers in 
poverty law where one can be excessively adversarial and "on the side 
of angels" simultaneously, a combination rich with negative ethics 
teaching implications.58 
There are underlying moral questions in the use of actual clients as 
the means for the laudable end of lawyer training.59 The lives and 
welfare of real people are at risk in the in-house clinic setting. This 
fact underlies the clinic's value and simultaneously forces clinic super-
visors frequently to intervene. For students to learn effectively the 
skills of problem solving inherent in identifying and treating ethical 
issues, they must form the mental pathways that will later be useful in 
their lifelong adventure in decision making.60 They must have a free 
hand in forming and nurturing a relationship with others. They are far 
less likely to get this free hand for mental e:l•:perimentation in a setting 
in which the supervisor frequently intervenes or is, at least figura-
tively, over the student's shoulder at all times. 
The model of the clinic, its inherent tension between educational 
interests and service interests, and the clinic's policies on supervisor 
intervention may communicate a great deal.61 Consider the situation 
when the clinician observes the student making an error in judgment. 
The error may be labeled serious or less so, and the evaluation will 
often determine whether or not the clinician intervenes. For example: 
55. See Gary Bellow, On Talking Tough to Eadz Other: Commems 011 Comllin, 33 
J. Legal Educ. 619, 620 (1983). 
56. Redlich takes a different view: the classroom teacher is a more dominant fig-
ure than the clinician because of the presence of other players in the student's clinical 
experience. See Redlich, supra note 54, at 615-16. 
57. See, e.g., Gilda M. Thoni, Teadzilzg Ethical Co11Sideratio11s itl the Clinical Set-
ting: Professiollal, Personal and Systemic, 52 Colo. L. Rev. 409, 413 (1981) (noting 
that clinics are well-suited to explore personal values). 
58. See Luban, Epistemology, supra note 13, at 660. 
59. See generally Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 26-72 
(Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill1969) (1785} (confronting the moral conun-
drum of acting on "pure duty" and the true motivations behind human actions). 
60. See Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind 82 (1986); Anthony D'Antato, The 
Decline and Fall of Law Teachilzg in the Age of Studelll Co11sumerism, 37 J. Legal 
Educ. 461, 462 (1987); James E. Molitemo, The Secret of Success: The Small-Section 
First-Year Skills Offering and Its RelatioiiShip to I11dependelll Thi11king, 55 Mo. L Rev. 
875, 877-78 (1990). 
61. For the philosophy of non-intervention, see Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 50, 
at 22-24. 
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(1) Student has researched the claims that a civil clinic client may have 
and plans to draft and file a complaint on Client's behalf following the 
upcoming spring break. Supervisor realizes that Student has failed to 
account for the statute of limitations on one of Client's claims that will 
run before Student plans to file the complaint; (2) In doing research 
on Client's claim, Student has misinterpreted a case that, if properly 
interpreted, would help Client more than Student thinks it does. The 
interpretive error might arguably make a difference in an upcoming 
hearing at which Student will represent Client; (3) As Supervisor ob-
serves, Student treats Client with disdain and insensitivity. Would 
most clinic supervisors intervene in any of these three situations? 
How grave, immediate, and irreversible must the harm to the client be 
before the supervisor intervenes to prevent or ameliorate such harm? 
Declining to intervene and giving students the free hand, which will 
enhance their learning, can be dangerous to the client and send unin-
tended messages about the relative importance of the client and the 
student's learning. When the clinician declines to intervene, and in-
stead allows the student to learn from the mistake either by letting the 
situation play out in its entirety or by counseling with the student after 
the bad performance, the clinician implicitly says to the student: 
"Your education was more valuable than good service was to the cli-
ent." Such a message teaches and reinforces the idea that it is appro-
priate for the lawyer to care more about herself than the client. 
Although in the run of cases clinic clients probably receive excellent 
service, it is disturbing to read descriptions-which some seem to re-
gard as a triumph of clinical education-of a "disastrous [client] inter-
view ... [which] provided [the clinic] student with ... valuable insight 
into the 'whys' of his behavior62 and the avenues for change. "63 The 
62. The full description of the behavior follows: 
He presents a videotape of a student-conducted interview with a distraught 
young woman seeking a divorce. The woman has never seen a lawyer 
before, does not have much money, and is not completely sure that she 
wants a divorce. To even the most naive observer, it appears that the stu-
dent, reputed to be academically capable, is incredibly deficient in the inter-
personal skills of interviewing and counseling his young client. During the 
course of the interview, the law student is unable to depart from strict aca-
demic orientation and authoritatively attempts to secure only the hard and 
cold facts upon which his client could be granted a divorce, while contempo-
raneously ignoring the very personal nature of his client's problems. While 
it appears that the client is emotionally unprepared and unwilling to commit 
herself to an immediate separation from her husband and to registration on 
welfare rolls, the law student seems to view such legal consequences as inevi-
table and directs all discourse toward those ends. 
One could argue that the student's ineptitude in interviewing skills re-
sulted not only from a lack of training in client counseling, but also from his 
general aversion, however unconscious, to the emotional matters before 
him. While the student may have been skilled in discovering and analyzing 
the legal facts of his client's predicament, he was unable to recognize emo-
tional factors. In this regard, the question arises whether the legal profes-
sion, "concerned with providing services to clients who are often struggling 
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clinic supervisor of this student undoubtedly intervened more care-
fully to counsel about alternatives with the client who was "emotion-
ally unprepared and unwilling to commit herself to an immediate 
separation from her husband and to registration on the welfare rolls, 
... [although the student had] direct[ ed] all discourse toward those 
ends"64 as inevitable legal consequences. Almost surely, the clinic su-
pervisor would not allow the "young" client who had "never seen a 
lawyer before" to be pushed into actions by the "incredibly deficient 
... interviewing and counseling"65 of the student. Despite best ef-
forts, however, it is less certain the supervisor could provide the emo-
tional repair to the client as easily as the repair of the purely legal 
aspects of the representation.66 If the same teaching of interpersonal 
skills can happen \vithout the infliction of human suffering, then it is 
fundamentally immoral to use real clients as tools of training, hurting 
people in the process \vith precisely the same sharp instrument that 
the teaching is designed to blunt. 
E. A Semester's Work May Be Ethically Misleading 
Most live-client clinical experiences are one semester in length.67 
Often, cases are carried over from previous students' work; new stu-
dents, unfamiliar \vith the nature of the relationship begun by the ear-
lier students except for what little can be gleaned from the file notes,68 
are unlikely to have a well-developed relationship with the client. In 
any event, the nature of the relationship may be cloudy for the stu-
dents for reasons that they have no real hope of discovering. Under 
such circumstances, what little the students may learn about client re-
lationships may be misleading, having resulted more from the previ-
ous, unknowable actions of prior student-lawyers. A similar absence 
of learning or mislearning occurs when students begin a relationship 
with difficult circumstances should perpetuate a selection process which pro-
duces practitioners who are disinclined, relative to others in the population, 
to respond with sympathy and understanding to emotional conflicts." In 
spite of the seemingly disastrous interview conducted by the law student, the 
videotaped clinical experience provided that student with an opportunity to 
evaluate his actions and characteristic motivations in interviewing and advis-
ing his client. Inasmuch as the deficiencies of the interview were commented 
on and analyzed by the clinical supervisor. the law student may have ac-
quired valuable insight into the "whys" of his behavior and the avenues for 
change. It is in this respect that clinical education further aids in the per-
sonal as well as professional development of law students. 




66. For another example of the possible ill-effects of non-intervention. sec Melt-
sner & Schrag, supra note 50, at 25-29. 
67. See Report, supra note 3, at 520. 
68. The file notes may be well done in terms of their rendition of the factual un-
derpinnings of the case, but are unlikely to reveal the nuances of the relationship. 
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with a client and pass the case on to the next group of students. 
Often, the realization of results from the quality of the early part of 
the client relationship is delayed until much later activity for the client 
is undertaken. As such, the lessons learned from the quality of early 
aspects of the client relationships are lost for the students who en-
gaged in those early activities. Although, as Pincus said, "there is no 
substitute for personally living through the circumstances which create 
the ethical dilemma and for having personally to face the conse-
quences of the action or inaction which is used as a response to the 
moral challenge,"69 very little facing of personal consequences occurs 
in the few months of a semester's work in an in-house clinic. More 
often the real consequences are passed along to others who have little 
appreciation for their source, and those who created circumstances 
that later produce bad consequences may be left to think that nothing 
of consequence resulted from their poor lawyering. 
II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW IsSUES 
There are two primary areas where professional responsibility law 
issues arise in clinics: conflicts and confidentiality. Naturally, there is 
some overlap between the two.70 
Authority specific to law school clinical programs on most of these 
issues is sparse or non-existent. Some of the authority cited in this 
paper refers to law firms, some to government and corporate law of-
fices, and some to legal aid offices. For different topics, each is proba-
bly the best analogy to a law school clinic. None of the three is a 
perfect match on all issues, in part because none of the three has an 
explicit education mission, in part because of each one's particular dif-
ferences from the law school clinical practice setting. Although little 
has been written specifically about professional responsibility law ap-
plications to law school clinics, some analogies can be drawn from the 
treatment of such issues in legal aid offices.71 
69. William Pincus, One Man's Perspective on Ethics and the Legal Profession, 12 
San Diego L. Rev. 279, 285 (1975). 
70. Some law schools' clinical programs have waded into these issues in a very 
constructive way, creating thoughtful policy documents. See, e.g., Memorandum from 
Debbie Maranville, Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of 
Law, to File (November 30, 1994) [hereinafter Maranville Memorandum] (on file with 
author) (developing University of Washington School of Law Conflicts of Interest 
Policy for the Clinical Law Program). Recent Clinical Section programs on conflicts 
issues and policies show that many others have an interest in these issues. 
71. See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 354-62 
(1978) (rejecting any model which calls for a standard of lawyering for poor persons 
different from that which governs private lawyers); Marshall J. Breger, Disqualifica-
tion for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid Attorney, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1115, 1116 
(1982) (arguing that attorneys who represent legal aid clients should be subject to the 
same ethical obligations as members of the private bar because the fiduciary relation-
ship between lawyer and client demands loyalty to one's client); David H. Taylor, 
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Let us take as an example a law school with a fairly well-developed 
clinical program with four components: a criminal defense clinic, a 
general civil practice clinic, a domestic violence clinic, and a housing 
issues clinic. I say "components" because I might think of them that 
way, as the clinical part of the curriculum and each clinic as a compo-
nent of the clinical part of the curriculum. The nature of the conflicts 
and confidentiality issues, however, largely turn on the question of 
treating each clinic as its own law office entity, or as a part of the 
larger law school clinic law office, or broader still as if the clinics were 
all a part of the law school's law office. This choice determines which 
of the conflicts questions are thorniest, what sort of policies regarding 
confidentiality and conflicts the clinics ought to have in place, and in-
deed, what some of the educational value of the clinic will be. 
A. Lawyer Interests v. Client Interests Conflicts 
Unlike the general lawyer population, a small portion of which is on 
the job hunt at any given moment, nearly all law students are actively 
searching for permanent and temporary (either summer or part-time 
during the academic year) employment. When clinic students seek 
employment in their community, potential conflicts develop between 
the student's interests and the interests of the clients the student rep-
resents. A criminal clinic student who interviews \vith the opposing 
prosecutor's office, a civil practice clinic student who interviews with 
an opposing law firm or institutional defendant (a bank opposing the 
student's client in a consumer law case, for example), or even a civil 
practice clinic student who represents a spouse in a domestic relations 
action and has accepted post-graduation employment with the local 
legal services provider that represents the opposed spouse all present 
conflicts issues under Model Rule 1.7(b).72 Such a conflict must be 
disclosed to the student's client and the representation may only pro-
ceed if the client consents after consultation.73 
One might argue that the student's interests would be aligned \vith 
rather than opposed to the client's in such a circumstance: the student 
would want to impress the prospective employer with her diligent, ef-
fective representation of the client. In some instances, students may 
well react that way, but the argument ignores the very real possibility 
that the student will want to curry favor \vith the prospective em-
Conflicts of Interest and the Indigem Client: Barring the Door to tlze Last Lawyer in 
Town, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 577-619 (1995) (suggesting alteration of ordinary profes-
sional ethics rules for the legal aid practice setting); Paul R Tremblay, Toward a Com-
munity-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L Rev. 1101, 1129-56 
(1990) (discarding the "individual zeal model" as applied to legal services practice 
because of the need to allocate limited resources to worthy cases and legal services' 
unique mission in serving the local community). 
72. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1998). 
73. See UL Rule 1.7(b)(2); Committee on Prof! Ethics, Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York, Formal Op. 79-37 (1979). 
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ployer by compromising the client's interests. Under the circum-
stances, the client ought to be the one to determine whether the risks 
are too great to bear. 
This prohibition should not restrict the representation activities of 
students merely because they have made mass mailings to a wide 
range of prospective employers with whom this sort of conflict would 
exist. Rather, the conflicts should only be a matter of consequence 
when a student actively pursues a particular job opportunity, usually 
denoted by the offer and acceptance of a job interview.74 
B. Multiple-Client Conflicts and Related Confidentiality Issues 
Several types of multiple-client conflicts may arise because of stu-
dents' multiple commitments during law school and because of the 
overlap of caseloads of multi-part clinics. As would any law firm, a 
clinical program must have conflicts check procedures in place to 
avoid such occurrences.75 Otherwise, the supervising lawyers risk 
discipline. 
If a law school treats its clinics as one large law office or as if the 
entire law school was a single law office, conflicts may exist between 
"branches" of the same76 office.77 For example, the civil practice 
clinic may find itself representing a battered spouse in a divorce action 
while the criminal practice clinic is representing the batteror with re-
spect to criminal charges; a criminal clinic may represent a trespass 
defendant, while the housing clinic represents the non-profit that set 
up the housing facility at which the trespass defendant allegedly tres-
passed.78 Treated as if they are a single law office, this multiple-part 
clinic has a multiple-client conflict, and a gross one at that. Such con-
flicts would plainly violate Model Rule 1.7(a). Indeed, in many such 
instances, the conflict would not be waivable by the clients because 
the lawyers could not "reasonably believe[ ] the representation will 
not adversely affect the relationship with the other client."79 
The simplest fix for these issues is a painful one for in-house clinics: 
they must treat each clinic (or at least those that seem likely to de-
velop inter-office conflicts) as separate entities. That means, unfortu-
nately, separate office space,80 support staff, fax machines, and 
74. See Committee on Prof! and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York, Formal Op. 1991-1 (1991). 
75. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.1(a) (1998). 
76. See id. Rule 1.7(a). 
77. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1385 (2d Cir. 1976). 
78. See Maranville Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2. 
79. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a)(1). 
80. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 
995 (1967) (suggesting that two lawyers sharing office space can have a conflict of 
interest in representation); Ethics Advisory Panel, Rhode Island Supreme Court, Op. 
93-66 (1993) (stating that four lawyers who "share secretarial and office expenses" arc 
considered a law firm); cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. 
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certainly separate faculty supervisors who may not consult one an-
other unless they ensure that they are not communicating client confi-
dences and are not creating conflicts. This is an odd circumstance for 
an academic, and it is bound to diminish clinical faculty members' de-
velopment and breadth of experience. 
It also means, and this may be most painful of all to some clinical 
programs, that students must meet in separate seminar components 
and must not share information about their cases and e"-periences. 
This reality will reduce the educational value of what could otherwise 
be interconnected in-house clinics. Clinical students have relatively 
small caseloads81 and a correspondingly small range of interactions 
with clients, courts, opposing lawyers, and others. Much of the value 
of the experience is found in the opportunity to share their exper-
iences with other cnnic students in their seminar meetings, get others' 
reactions to their impressions, hear other students's experiences, and 
share in the critique of them as well.82 Operating each clinic as a sepa-
rate entity limits the range of other student e"-periences that each 
clinic student will be able to hear about and discuss. 
Even when a clinical program treats each clinic as its own entity, 
multiple client conflicts arise. Students often have multiple jobs dur-
ing law school, even while working in a clinic. They also move fairly 
readily from job to job, from year to year, and summer to summer. 
These multiple commitments create the likelihood of students being 
exposed to opposing parties in the same matter (for example, criminal 
defense clinic student who works in the prosecutor's office),83 multiple 
parties nominally on the same side of litigation but with differing in-
terests (for example, environmental law clinic student works part-time 
in a law firm that represents other environmental plaintiffs from those 
represented by the clinic),84 successive employment and clinic work 
on opposite sides of a matter (for example, civil practice clinic student 
worked in a law firm the prior summer that represents Bank. now civil 
practice clinic represents consumers against Bank in a Truth-in-Lend-
ing matter).85 The examples and possibilities are limitless. 
If careful screening is done, some of these multiple-client issues may 
be avoidable. But in the context of an in-house clinic, what does 
screening mean? It means, of course, all the usual things, such as re-
quiring lawyers (the students) to refrain from communicating with a 
Formal Op. 88-356 (1988) (recognizing that two practitioners can share office space 
and not be "regarded as constituting a firm" unless "they present themselves to the 
public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm"). 
81. See Report, supra note 3, at 546-48. 
82. See Christine M. Venter, Encouraging Personal Responsibility-An Alremati\'e 
Approadz to Teaching Legal Ethics, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer/Autumn 1995, 
at 287, 290-93. 
83. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a). 
84. See id. Rule 1.7(b). 
85. See id. Rule 1.9. 
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conflicted member of the community about the conflicting matter, 
maintaining files in a way that prevents a conflicted member from 
having access to them, and so on.86 Moreover, in an academic setting, 
it also means requiring conflicted students to absent themselves from 
class when the discussion turns to the conflicting matter. Again, this is 
a rather strange, but necessary, circumstance in an academic course. 
Many law school clinics work closely with the local legal aid pro-
grams, and that is undoubtedly constructive in many ways. It does, 
however, increase multiple-client conflict potential. In one state, for 
example, "all intake for [legal services in] the state ... [is] done by law 
students in the Clinic."87 This collaboration is a marvelous educa-
tional experience for the students, but, because confidentiality at-
taches when a prospective client begins communicating with a lawyer, 
conflicts can exist between prospective clients and either current or 
former clients.88 Being exposed to every legal aid intake interview in 
the state dramatically increases the likelihood of confidentiality 
breaches and conflicts. The conflict check mechanism needed to pro-
tect against such possibilities needs to be a sophisticated one. 
C. Confidentiality Issues Unrelated to Conflicts of Interest 
Confidentiality issues attach to in-house clinics that are unrelated to 
conflicts concerns, and may be somewhat more troubling than similar 
issues in post-law school practice. Students who form short-term rela-
tionships with clients may be less protective of client confidences. 
Special effort must be given to instructing students that they may not 
use examples from clinic experiences in other classes. That concern 
aside, when seminar components of clinical courses permit enrollment 
of non-clinic students, special protections must be adopted. The very 
purpose of such a class is to have students discuss their cases among 
their colleagues. Students who are not members of the clinical "firm" 
are not entitled to hear the confidences of the clinic's clients. 
The fix for this problem may be a requirement that clinic students 
use fictitious names and slightly altered facts when describing their 
86. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding 
no imputed disqualification of a firm in a security fraud derivative suit where a former 
SEC employee was properly screened for all participation in the case and the SEC 
turned over applicable information before the firm was retained); Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (disqualifying a law firm for the conflict of interest of 
its attorney through imputation). 
87. E-mail from Christine M. McDermott, Supervising Attorney of the Delaware 
Civil Clinic at Widener University, to multiple recipients of list at 
<lawclinic@lawlib.wuacc.edu> (June 4, 1997) (on file with author). 
88. See, e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding 
that attorneys were disqualified from representing a party against a former client 
when both parties were previously joint clients); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990) (stating that a lawyer, without waiver 
of confidentiality, must withdraw or decline representation of prospective client when 
imparted information affects the representation of other clients). 
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cases.89 But that fix diminishes the educational value of the seminar 
and is unlikely to be a useful experience for any of the students in-
volved.90 Even at that, the fix may be unsuccessful at protecting client 
confidences. Control over the range of outside work activities of the 
non-clinic students is unlikely. Scattered throughout the community 
in various legal work environments, merely hearing the basic fact pat-
tern may be enough to reveal confidences to students who are familiar 
with the dispute from their own workplace. The risks are just too 
great. Imagine having a law firm discussion of pending matters, even 
with an effort to disguise client identities, among a group of colleagues 
outside the firm who work at the full range of other legal employers in 
the community from legal aid programs, law firms, corporate law of-
fices, and government agency offices. The individuals in such a class 
will lack the sense of common mission that is shared by lawyers who 
work for the same organization and \vill have a wide range of diver-
gent interests and commitments. The risk of confidentiality breaches 
in such a setting is unacceptably high. 
D. The Danger of Saying, "The Education Mission Trumps the 
Professional Norms." 
Clinics are meant to teach professional norms and critique them. It 
would certainly be appropriate to challenge the application of those 
norms to the clinical setting. No one should criticize an effort to con-
struct a reasonable argument that different norms should apply to law 
school clinics than apply in other practice settings. But these argu-
ments are unlikely to succeed in this context. The norms that underlie 
the issues discussed in this paper are central to the profession: protec-
tion of client confidences, loyalty to clients, avoidance or fair resolu-
tion of conflicts of interest. Each is critical to the lawyer's role in all 
settings, even if the interpretation of particular applications may vary 
from practice setting to practice setting. A successful assault on their 
application in law school clinics may be based on the proposition that 
education is more valuable than these fundamental norms. That is a 
dangerous message to deliver to students, and it is likely to produce 
self-serving rationalizations for all manner of client abuses. 
CONCLUSION 
Clinical legal education generally and in-house clinics particularly 
have great value for students, legal education, the legal profession, 
and the public. The overarching issues discussed in this Article exist, 
however, and need further study and consideration. 
None of the law governing lawyers' issues that arise \vith frequency 
regarding in-house clinics is fatal to their operation, but they must be 
89. See Venter, supra note 82, at 293. 
90. See id. at 293-94. 
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attended to just as law firms and government law offices attend to 
such issues. Just as in other law offices, the issues can be confronted, 
guarded against, and resolved thoughtfully when best efforts to avoid 
them fail. The complication in the clinical setting is the educational 
mission of the programs. Some of the measures taken to comply with 
professional ethics rules diminish the educational value of the clinic. 
That is unfortunate but necessary. Failing to be sensitive to the gov-
erning norms of the profession teaches students exactly the wrong 
thing, particularly if they observe the disregard given the professions' 
norms by their clinic supervisor. 
